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Abstract. The notion that there are many “universes” with different properties
is one answer to the question of “why is the universe so hospitable to life?” This
notion also naturally follows from current ideas in eternal inflation and string/M
theory. But how do we test such a “multiverse” theory: which of the many universes
do we compare to ours? This paper enumerates would would seem to be essential
ingredients for making testable predictions, outlines different strategies one might take
within this framework, then discusses some of the difficulties and dangers inherent in
these approaches. Finally, I address the issue of whether there may be some general,
qualitative predictions that multiverse theories might share.
1. Introduction
The standard model of particle physics and the standard model of cosmology are both
rife with numerical parameters that must have values fixed by hand to explain the
observed world. The world would be a radically different place if some of these constants
took a different value. In particular, it has been argued that if any one of six (or perhaps
a few more) numbers did not have rather particular values, then life as we know it would
not be possible [1]: atoms would not exist, or no gravitationally bound structures would
form in the universe, or some other calamity would occur that would appear to make
the (alter)-universe a very dull and lifeless place. How, then, did we get so lucky as to
be here?
This question is an interesting one because all of the possible answers to it
that I have encountered or devised entail very interesting conclusions. An essentially
exhaustive list of such answers is:
(i) We just got very lucky: all of the numbers could have been very different, in which
case the universe would have been barren – but they just happened by pure chance
to take values in the tiny part of parameter space that would allow life. We owe
our existence to one very, very, very lucky roll of the dice.†
† If the parameters were explained – by some deeper theory – in terms of fewer or no parameters, this
does not change much: it would explain the origin of the parameters, but their hospitality to life would
still be dumb luck.
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(ii) We weren’t particularly lucky: almost any set of parameters would have been fine,
because life would find a way to arise in nearly any type of universe. This is quite
interesting because it implies (at least theoretically) the existence of life forms
radically different from our own, existing for example in universes with no atoms
or with no bound structure, or overrun with black holes, etc.
(iii) The universe was specifically designed for life. The choice of constants only
happened once, but their values were determined in some way by the need for
us to arise. This might be divine agency, or some radical form of Wheeler’s “self-
creating universe”, or super-advanced beings that travel back in time to set the
constants at the beginning of the universe, etc. However the reader feels about this
possibility, they must admit that it would be interesting if true.
(iv) We did not have to get lucky, because there are many universes with different sets
of constants – i.e., the dice were rolled many, many times. We are necessarily in
one of the universes that allows life, just as we necessarily reside on a planet that
supports life, even when most others may not. This is interesting because it means
that there are other very different universes coexisting with ours in a “multiverse”.
These four answers – luck, elan vital, design, and multiverse – will appeal at different
levels to different readers. But I think it is hard to argue that the multiverse is necessarily
less reasonable than the alternatives. Moreover, as is discussed at length elsewhere in
this volume, there are quite independent reasons to believe, on the basis of inflation,
quantum cosmology, and string/M theory, that there might quite naturally be many
regions larger than our observable universe, governed by different sets of low-energy
physics. I am not aware of any independent scientific argument for the other three
possible explanations.
Whether they are contemplated as an answer to the “why are we lucky” question,
or because they are forced upon us from other considerations, multiverses come at a
high price. Even if we have in hand a physical theory and cosmological model that lead
to a multiverse, how do we test it? If there are many sets of constants, which ones do
we compare to those we observe? In the next section of this chapter I will outline what
I think a sound prediction in a multiverse would look like. As will become clear, this
requires many ingredients, and there are some quite serious difficulties in generating
some of these ingredients, even with a full theory in hand. For this reason, many short-
cuts have been devised to try to make predictions more easily. In the third section I will
describe a number of these, and show the cost that this convenience entails. Finally, in
Section 4 I will focus on the interesting question of whether the anthropic approach to
cosmology might lead to any general conclusions about how the study of cosmology will
look in coming years.
2. Making predictions in a multiverse
Imagine that we have a candidate physical theory and set of cosmological boundary
conditions (hereafter denoted T ) that predicts an ensemble of physically realized
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systems, each of which is approximately homogeneous in some coordinates and can be
characterized by a set of parameters (i.e. the constants appearing in the standard models
of particle physics and cosmology; I assume here that the laws of physics themselves
retain the same form). Let us denote each such system a “universe” and the ensemble a
“multiverse”. Given that we can observe only one of these universes, what conclusions
can we draw regarding the correctness of T , and how?
One possibility would be if there were a parameter for which none of the universes
in the ensemble had the value we observe. In this case T would be ruled out. (Note
that any T in which at least one parameter has a range of values that it does not take
in any universe is thus rigorously falsifiable, which is a nice thing for a theory to be). Or
perhaps some parameter takes only one value in all universes, and this value matches
the observed one. This would obviously be a significant accomplishment of the theory.
Both possibilities are good as far as they go, and seem completely uncontroversial. But
they do not go far enough. What if our observed parameter values appear in some but
not all of the universes? Could we still rule out the theory if those values are incredibly
rare, or gain confidence if they are extremely common?
I find it hard to see why not. If some theory predicts outcome A of some experiment
with p = 0.99999999 probability, and outcome B with probability 1−p, I think we would
be reluctant to accept the theory if a single experiment were performed and showed
outcome B, even if we did not get to repeat the experiment. In fact, it seems consistent
with all normal scientific methodology to rule out the theory at 99.999999% confidence
– the problem is just that without repeating our measurements we will not be able to
increase this confidence. This seems to be exactly analogous to the multiverse if we can
compute, given our T , the probability that we should observe a given value for some
observable.
Can we compute this probability distribution in a multiverse? Perhaps. I will argue
that to do so in a sensible way, we would need seven successive ingredients.
(i) First, of course, we require a multiverse: an ensemble of regions, each of which
would be considered a universe to observers inside it (i.e. its properties would be
uniform for as far as those observers could see), but each of which may have different
properties.
(ii) Next we need to isolate the set of parameters characterizing the different universes.
This might be the set of 20-odd free parameters in the standard model of particle
physics (see, e.g., Ref. [2] and references therein), plus a dozen or so cosmological
parameters [3, 4]. There might be additional parameters that become important
in other universes, or differences (such as different forms of the physical laws)
that cannot be characterized by differences in a finite set of parameters. But for
simplicity let us assume that some set of N numbers αi (where i = 1..N) fully
specify each universe.
(iii) Given our parameters, we need some measure with which to calculate the multi-
dimensional probability distribution P (αi) for the parameters. We might, for
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example, “count each universe equally” to obtain the probability PU(αi), defined
to be the chance that a randomly chosen universe from the ensemble would have
the parameter values αi.‡ This can be a bit tricky, however, because it depends on
how we delineate the universes: suppose that α1 = a universes happen to be 10
10
times larger than α1 = b universes. What would then prevent us from “splitting”
each α1 = a universe into 10, or 100, or 10
10 universes, thus radically changing the
relative probability of α1 = a vs. α1 = b? These considerations might lead us to
take a different measure such as volume, e.g. to define PV (αi), the chance that a
randomly point in space would reside in a universe with parameter values αi. But
in an expanding universe volume increases, so this would depend on the time at
which we choose to evaluate the volume in each universe. We might then consider
some “counting” object that endures, say a baryon (which is relatively stable), and
define PB(αi), the chance that a randomly chosen baryon would reside in a universe
with parameter values αi. But now we have excluded from consideration universes
with no baryons. Do we want to do that? This will be addressed in step (v). For
now, note only that it is not entirely clear, even in principle, which measure we
should place over our multiverse. We can call this the “measure problem.”
(iv) Once we choose a measure objectM , we still need to actually compute PM(αi), and
this may be far from easy. For example, in computing PV , some universes may have
infinite volume. In this case values of αi leading to universes with finite volume
will have zero probability. How, though, do we compare two infinite volumes? The
difficulty can be seen by considering how we would count the fraction of red vs.
blue marbles in an infinite box. We could pick one red, then one blue, and find a
50-50 split. But we could also repeatedly pick 1 red, then 2 blue, or 5 red, then 1
blue. We could do this forever and so obtain any ratio we like. What we would like
to do is just “grab a bunch of marbles at random” and count the ratio. But in the
multiverse case it is not so clear how to perform this random ordering of marbles to
pick. This difficulty, which might be termed the “ordering problem” [4], has been
discussed a number of times in the context of eternal inflation [5, 6, 7, 8] and a
number of plausible prescriptions have been proposed. But there does not seem to
be any generic solution, or convincing way to prove that one method is correct.
(v) If we have managed to calculate PM(αi), do we have a prediction? Sortof. We
have an answer to the question: “given that I am (or can associate myself with)
a randomly chosen M-object, which sort of universe am I in?” But this is not
necessarily the same as the more general question: “what sort of universe am I in?”
First of all, different M-objects will generally give different probabilities, and they
cannot all be the answer to the same question. Second, we may not be all that
closely associated with our M-object (which was chosen mainly to provide some
way to compute probabilities) because it does not take into account important
‡ Note that this is really shorthand for dP
dα1..dαN
dα1..dαN , the probability that αi are all within the
interval [αi, αi + dαi], where P(αi) is a cumulative probability distribution.
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requirements for our existence. For example, if M were volume, I would be asking
what I should observe given that I am at a random point in space; but we are not
at a random point in space (which would on average have a density of 10−29 g/cc),
but rather at one of the very rare points with density ∼ 1 g/cc. The reason for
this improbable situation is obviously “anthropic” – we just do not worry about
it because we can observe many other regions at the proper density (if we could
not see such regions, we might be more reluctant to accept a cosmological model
with such a low average density.) Finally, it might be argued that the question we
have answered through our calculation is not nearly as specific a question as we
could ask, because we know a lot more about the universe than that it contains
volume, or baryons. We might, instead, ask “given that I am in a universe with the
properties we have already observed, what should I observe in the future?”
As discussed at length in [9], these different specific questions can be usefully
thought of as arising from different choices of conditionalization. The probabilities
PM(αi) are conditioned on as little as possible, whereas the anthropic question of
“given that I am a randomly chosen observer, which should I measure” specifies
probabilities conditioned on the existence of an “observer”, while the approach of
“given what I know now, what will I see” specifies probabilities conditioned on
being in a universe with all of the properties that we have already observed. These
are three genuinely different approaches to making predictions in a multiverse that
may be termed, respectively, “bottom-up”, “anthropic”, and “top down”.
Let us denote by O the conditionalization object used to specify these conditional
probabilities. In bottom-up reasoning, it would be the same as the M-object; in
the anthropic approach it would be an “observer”, and in the top-down approach
it could be a universe with the currently-known properties of our universe. It
can be seen that they inhabit a spectrum, from the weakest conditionalization
(bottom-up) to the most stringent (top-down). Like our initial M-object, choosing
a conditionalization is unavoidable and important, and there is no obviously correct
choice to make. (See Refs. [10, 11] for similar conditionalization schemas.)
(vi) Having decided on a conditionalization object O, the next step is to compute
the number of NO,M(αi) of O-objects per M-object, for each set of values of the
parameters αi. For example, if we have chosen to condition on observers, but have
used baryons to define our probabilities, then we need to calculate the number
of observers per baryon as a function of cosmological parameters. We can then
calculate PO(αi) ≡ PM(αi)NO,M(αi), i.e. the probability that a randomly chosen O-
object (observer) resides in a universe with parameters αi. There are a few possible
pitfalls in doing this. First, if NO,M is infinite, then the procedure clearly breaks
because PO then becomes undefined. This is why the M-object should be chosen
to requires as little as possible for its existence (and hence be associated with the
minimal-conditionalization bottom-up approach). This difficulty will generically
occur if the existence of an O-object does not necessarily entail the existence of an
M-object. For example, if the M-object were a baryon but the O-object were a
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bit of volume, then N would be infinite for αi corresponding to universes with no
baryons. The problem arises because baryons require volume to be in, but volume
does not require a baryon to be in it. This seems straightforward, but gets much
murkier when we consider the second difficulty when calculating N , which is that
we may not be able to precisely define what an O-object is, or what it takes to make
one. If we say that the O-object is an observer, what exactly does that mean? A
human? A carbon-based life form? Can observers exist without water? Without
heavy elements? Without baryons? Without volume? It seems quite hard to say.
We are forced, then, to choose some proxy for an observer, e.g. a galaxy, or a star
with possible planets, etc. But our probabilities will perforce depend on the chosen
proxy and this must be kept in mind.
It is worth noting a small bit of good news here. If we do manage to consistently
compute NO,M1 for some measure object M1, then insofar as we want to condition
our probabilities on O-objects, we have solved the measure problem: if we could
consistently calculate NO,M2 for a different measure object M2, then we should
obtain the same result for NO, i.e. NO,M1PM1 = NO,M2PM2 . Thus our choice of M1
(rather than M2) becomes unimportant.
(vii) The final step in making predictions is to make the assumption that the probability
that we will measure some set of αi is given by the probability that a randomly
chosen O-object will. This assumption really entails two others: first, that we are
some how directly associated with O-objects, and second that we have not, simply
by bad luck, observed highly improbable values of the parameters. The assumption
that we are typical observers has been termed the “principle of mediocrity” [12].
One may argue about this assumption, but some assumption is necessary if we are
to connect our computed probabilities to observations, and it is difficult to see what
alternative assumption would be more reasonable.
The result of all this work would be the probability PO(αi) that a randomly selected
O-object (out of all of the O-objects that exist in multiverse) would reside in a universe
governed by parameters αi, along with a reason to believe that this same probability
distribution should govern what we will observe. We can then make the observations (or
consider some already-made ones). If the observations are highly improbable according
to our predictions, we can rule out the candidate T at some confidence that depends on
how improbable our observations were. Apart from the manifest and grave difficulties
involved in actually completing the seven listed steps in a convincing way, I think the
only real criticism that can be leveled at this approach is that unless P = 0 for our
observed paramters, there will always be the chance that the T was correct and we
measured an unlikely result. Usually, we can rid ourselves of this problem by repeating
our experiments to make P as small as we like (at least in principle), while here we do
not have that option – once we have “used up” the measurement of all of the paramters
required to describe our universe (which appears to be rather surprisingly few, at least
according to current theories), we are done.
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3. Making predictions in a multiverse more easily: a bestiary of shortcuts
Although the idea of a multiverse has been around for quite a while, no one has ever
really come close to making the sort of calculation outlined in the previous section.§
Instead, those wishing to make predictions in a multiverse context have made strong
assumptions about which parameters αi actually vary across the ensemble, about
the choice of O-object, and about the quantities PM(αi) and NO,M(αi) that go into
predicting their probabilities for measurement. Some of these shortcuts aim simply to
make a calculation tractable; others are efforts to avoid anthropic considerations, or
alternatively to use anthropic considerations to avoid other difficulties.
I would not have listed any ingredients that I thought could be omitted from a
really sound calculation, thus all of these shortcuts are necessarily incomplete (some,
in my opinion, disastrously so). But by listing and discussing them, I hope to give the
reader both a flavor for what sort of anthropic (or anthropic-esque) arguments have
been made in the literature, and where they may potentially go astray.
3.1. The “Maybe anthropic considerations only allow one set of parameters” hope
This assumption underlies a sort of anthropic reasoning that has earned the anthropic
principle a lot of ill will. It goes something like: “Let’s assume that lots of universes
governed by lots of different parameter values exist. Then since only universes with
parameter values almost exactly the same as ours allow life, we must be in one of
those, and we should not find it strange if our parameter values seem special.” In
the conventions I have described, this is essentially equivalent setting O-objects to be
observers, then hoping that the “hospitality factor” Nobs,M(αi) is very narrowly peaked
around one particular set of parameters. In this case, the a priori probabilities PM
are pretty much irrelevant because the shape of Nobs,M will pick out just one set of
parameters. Because our observed values αobsi definitely allow observers, the allowed set
must then be very near αobsi .
Three problems with this type of reasoning are as follows. First, it is rather
circular: it entails picking the O-object to be an observer, but then quickly substituting
a “universe just like ours” for the O-object, with the reasoning that such universes will
definitely support life.‖ Thus we have arrived at: the universe we observe should be
pretty much like the observed universe. The way to avoid this silliness is to allow at least
the possibility that there are life-supporting universes with αi 6= α
obs
i , i.e. to discard the
unproven assumption that Nobs,M has a single, dominant, narrow peak.
The second problem is that if Nobs,M were really so narrowly peaked as to render
PM irrelevant, then we would be in serious trouble as theorists, because we would lose
§ The most ambitious attempt is probably the recent one by Tegmark [4].
‖ One can also argue that if there were other, more common, universes that supported life, we ought
to be in them; since we are, not, we should assume that almost all life-supporting universes are like
ours. But this is also circular in assuming that the whole anthropic argument works, in formulating
the argument.
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any ability to distinguish between candidates for our fundamental theory: unless our
observed universe is impossible in the theory, then the anthropic factor would force the
predictions of the theory to match our observations. As discussed in the next section,
this is not good.
The third problem with Nobs,M being an extremely peaked function is that it does
not appear to be true! As discussed in below, it appears that for any reasonable surrogate
for observers (e.g. galaxies like ours, or stars with heavy elements, etc.), calculations
done using our current understanding of galaxy and structure formation indicate that
the region of parameter space in which there can be many of those objects may be small
compared to the full parameter space, but it is much larger than the region compatible
with our observations.
3.2. The “Just look for zero probability regions (P = 0) in parameter space” approach
As mentioned in Section 2, there is a (relatively!) easy thing to do with a multiverse
theory T : work out which parameters combinations cannot occur in any universe. If
the combination we actually observe is one of these, then the theory is ruled out. This
is unobjectionable, but a rather weak way to test a theory because given two theories
that are not ruled out, we have no way whatsoever of judging one to be better, even if
the parameter values we observe are in some sense generic in one and absurdly rare in
the other.¶
This is not how science usually works. For example, suppose our theory is that a
certain coin-tossing process is unbiased. If our only way to test this theory was to look
for experimental outcomes that are impossible, then the theory would unfalsifiable: we
would have to accept it theory for any coin we are confronted with, because no sequence
of tosses would be impossible in it! Even if 10,000 tosses in a row all came up heads,
we would have no grounds for doubting our theory because while getting heads 10,000
times in a row on a fair coin is absurdly improbably, it is not impossible. Nor would we
have reason to prefer the (seemingly much better) “nearly every toss comes out heads”
theory. Clearly this is a situation we would like to improve on, as much in universes as
in coin tosses.
3.3. The “Let’s look for overwhelmingly more probable values” suggestion
One possible improvement would be to assume that we will observe a “typical” set of
parameters in the ensemble, i.e. that we will employ “bottom-up” reasoning as described
in the first section, by using the a priori (or “prior”) probabilities PM for some choice
of measure-object such as universes, and just ignore the conditionalization factor NO,M .
There are two possible justifications for this. First, we might simply want to avoid any
¶ Amusingly, in terms of testing T , this approach which makes no assumptions about NO,M is
equivalent to the approach just described of making the very strong assumption that NO,M allows
only one specific set of parameter values, because in either case a theory can only be ruled out if our
observed values are impossible in that theory.
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sort of anthropic issues on principle. Second, we might hope that some parameter values
are much, much more common than others, to the extent that the NO,M -factor becomes
irrelevant – in other words that PM (rather than NO,M) is a very strongly peaked around
some particular parameters.
The problem with this approach is the “measure problem” discussed above: there is
an implicit choice of basing probabilities on universes (say) rather than on (say) volume
elements or baryons. Each of these measures has problems – for example, it seems that
probabilities based on “universes” depends on how the universes are delineated, which
can be ambiguous. Moreover there seems to be no reason to believe that predictions
made using any two measures should agree particularly well. For example, as discussed
elsewhere in this volume, in the string theory “landcape” there are many possible
parameter sets, depending on which metastable minimum one chooses in a potential
that depends in turn on a number of fluxes that can take a large range of discrete
values. Imagine that exponentially many more minima lead to α1 = a than lead to
α1 = b. Should we expect to observe α1 = a? Not necessarily, because the relative
number of a-universes vs. b-universes that actually come into existence may easily differ
exponentially from the relative number of a-minima vs. b-minima. (This seems likely
to me in an eternal-inflation context, where the relative number universes could depend
on exponentially-suppressed tunnelings between vacua.) Worse yet, these may in turn
differ exponentially (or even by an infinite factor) from the relative numbers of baryons,
or relative volumes.
In short, while we are free to use bottom-up reasoning with any choice of measure
object we like, we are not free to assert that other choices would give similar predictions,
or that conditionalization can be rendered irrelevant. So we had better have a pretty
good reason for the choice we make.
3.4. The “Let’s fix some parameters to the observed values and predict others” shortcut
Another way in which one might hope to circumvent anthropic issues is to condition
the probabilities on some or all observations that have already been made. In this
“top-down” (or perhaps “pragmatic”) approach we ask: given everything that has been
observed so far, what will we observe in some future measurement? It has a certain
appeal, as this is often what is done in experimental science: we do not try to predict
what our laboratory will look like, just what will happen given that the lab is in a
particular state at a given time. In the conventions of Section 2, the approach could
consist of choosing the O-object to be universes with parameters agreeing with the
measured values.
While appealing, this approach suffers some deficiencies:
• It still does not completely avoid the measure problem, because even once we have
limited our consideration to universes that match our current observations, we must
still choose a measure with which to calculate the probabilities for the remaining
ones.
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• Through our conditioning, we may accept theories for which our parameter values
are wildly improbable, without supplying any justification as to why we observe
such improbable values. This is rather strange. Imagine that I have a theory in
which the cosmological constant Λ is (with very high probability) much higher than
we observe, and the dark matter particle massmDM is almost certainly > 1000GeV.
I condition on our observed Λ, simply accepting that I am in an unusual universe.
Now say I measure mDM = 1GeV. I would like to say my theory is ruled out. Fine,
but here is where it gets odd: according to top-down reasoning, I should also have
already ruled it out if I had done my calculation in 1997, before Λ was measured.
And someone who invented the very same theory next week – but had not been
told that I have already ruled it out – would not rule it out, but instead just take
the low value of mDM (along with the observed Λ) as part of the conditionalization!
• If we condition on everything we have observed, we obviously give up the possibility
of explaining anything we have observed (which at this point is quite a lot in
cosmology) through our theory.
The last two issues motivate variations on the top-down approach in which only
some current observations are conditioned on. Two of which I am aware are:
(i) We might start by conditioning on all observations, then progressively condition
on less and less and try to “predict” the things we have decided not to condition
on (as well, of course, as any new observations)[13, 14]. The more we can predict,
the better our theory is. The problem is that either (a) we will get to the point
where we are conditioning on as little as possible (the bottom-up approach), and
hence the whole conditionalization process will have been a waste of time, or (b)
we will still have to condition on some things, and admit either that these have an
anthropic explanation, or that we just choose to condition on them (leading to the
funny issues discussed above).
(ii) We might choose at the outset to condition on things that we think may be fixed
anthropically (without trying to actually generate this explanation), then try to
predict the others [15]. This is nice in being relatively easy, and in providing a
justification for the conditionalization. It suffers from the problems of (a) guessing
which parameters are anthropically important and which are not, (b) even if a
parameter is anthropically unimportant, it may be strongly correlated in PM with
one that is, and (c) we still have to face the measure problem, which we cannot
avoid by counting conditioning on observers, because we are avoiding anthropic
considerations.
3.5. The “Let’s assume just one parameter varies” simplification
Most of the “shortcuts” discussed so far have been attempts to avoid anthropic
considerations. But we may, instead, consider how me might try to formulate an
anthropic prediction (or explanation) for some observable, without going through the
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full calculation outlined in Section 2. The way of doing this that has been employed in
the literature (largely in the efforts of Vilenkin and collaborators) is as follows.
First, one fixes all but one (or perhaps two) of the parameters to the observed
values. This is done for tractability and/or because one hopes that they will have non-
anthropic explanations. Let us call the parameter that is allowed to vary across the
ensemble α.
Next, an O-object is chosen such that given that only α varies, it is hoped that
(a) the number NO,M of these objects (per baryon, or per comoving volume element)
in a given universe is calculable, and (b) this number is arguably proportional to the
number of observers. For example, if only Λ varies across the ensemble, galaxies might
make reasonable O-objects because a moderately different Λ will probably not change
the number of observers per galaxy, but will change the number of galaxies in a way that
can be computed using fairly well-understood theories of galaxy and structure formation
(for examples see [16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 4]).
Third, it is assumed that PM(α) is either flat or a simple power-law, without any
complicated structure. This can be done just for simplicity, but it is often argued to be
natural [22, 23, 24]. The flavor of this argument is as follows. If PM is to have interesting
structure over the relatively small range in which observers are abundant, there must
be a parameter of order the observed α in the expression for PM . But precisely this
absence is what motivated the anthropic approach. For example, if the expression for
PM(Λ) contained the energy scale ∼ 0.01 eV corresponding to the observed Λ, the origin
of that energy scale would probably be more interesting than our anthropic argument,
as it would provide the basis for a (non-anthropic) solution to the cosmological constant
problem!
Under these (fairly strong) assumptions we can then actually calculate PO(α) and
see whether or not the observed value is reasonably probable given this predicted
distribution. For example when Λ alone is varied, a randomly chosen galaxy is predicted
to lie in a universe with Λ comparable to (but somewhat larger than) the value we
see [17].+
I actually think this sort of reasoning is pretty respectable, given the assumptions
made. In particular, the anthropic argument in which only Λ varies is a relatively clean
one. But there are a number of pitfalls when it is applied to parameters other than Λ,
or when one allows multiple parameters to vary simultaneously.
• Assuming that the abundance of observers is strictly proportional to that of galaxies
only makes sense if the number of galaxies – and not their properties – changes
as α varies. However, changing nearly any cosmological parameter will change
the properties of typical galaxies. For example, increasing Λ will decrease galaxy
numbers, but also make galaxies smaller on average, because a high Λ squelches
structure formation at late times when massive galaxies form. Increasing the
+ This is for a “flat” probability distribution dPM/dλ ∝ λ
α with α = 0. For α > 0, higher values
would be predicted, and with λ < 0 lower values would be favored.
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amplitude of primordial perturbations would similarly lead to smaller, denser – but
more numerous – galaxies, as would increasing ratio of dark matter to baryons. In
these cases, we must specify in more detail what properties an observer-supporting
galaxy should have, and this is very difficult to do without falling into the circular-
argument trap of assuming that only galaxies like ours support life. Finally, this sort
of strategy seems unlikely to work if we try to change non-cosmological parameters,
as this could lead to radically different physics and the necessity of thinking very
hard about what sort of observers there might be.
• The predicted probability distribution clearly depends on PM , and the assumption
that PM is flat, or a simple power law, can break down. This can happen even
for Λ [17] but perhaps more naturally for other parameters such as the dark
matter density for which particle physics models can already yield sensible values.
Moreover, this breakdown is much more probable if (as discussed below and contrary
to the assumption made above) the hospitality factor NO,M(α) is significant over
many orders of magnitude in α.
• Calculations of the hospitality factor NO,M(α) can go awry if α is changed more
than a little. For example, a neutrino mass slightly larger than we observe would
suppress galaxy formation by erasing small-scale structure. But neutrinos with a
large (∼>100 eV) mass would act as dark matter and lead to strong halo formation.
Whether these galaxies would be hospitable is questionable (they would be very
baryon-poor), but the point is that the physics becomes qualitatively different. As
another example, a lower photon/baryon ratio nγ/nb would lead to earlier-forming,
denser galaxies. But a much smaller value would lead to qualitatively different
structure formation, as well as the primordial generation of heavy elements [3]. As
discussed at length in ref. [3], these changes are very dangerous because over orders
of magnitude in α, PM(α) will tend to change by many orders of magnitude. Thus
even if these alter-universes only have a few observers in them, they may dominate
PO and hence qualitatively change the predictions.
• Along the same lines, but perhaps even more pernicious, when multiple parameters
are varied simultaneously, the effects of some variations can offset the effect of
others so that universes quite different from ours can support many of our chosen
O-objects. For example, increasing Λ cuts off galaxy formation at a given cosmic
density, but raising the perturbation amplitude Q causes galaxies to form earlier
(thus nullifying the effect of Λ). This can be seen in the calculations of [25, 18], and
is discussed explicitly in [3, 21, 4]. Many such deneneracies exist, because rasing Λ,
nγ/nb, or the neutrino mass all decrease the efficiency of structure formation, while
raising ΩDM/Ωb or Q increase the efficiency. As an extreme case, it was shown in [3]
that if Q and nγ/nb are allowed to vary with Λ, then universes with Λ of 10
17 times
our observed value could arguably support observers! Including more cosmological
parameters, or non-cosmological parameters, can only make this problem worse.
These problems indicate that while anthropic arguments concerning Λ in the
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literature are relatively “clean”, it is unclear whether other parameters (taken
individually) will work as nicely. More importantly, a number of issues arise when
several parameters are allowed to vary at once, and there does not seem to be any
reason to believe that success in explaining one parameter anthropically will persist
when additional parameters are allowed to vary. In some cases, it may: for example,
allowing neutrino masses to vary in addition to Λ does not appear to spoil the anthropic
explanation of a small but nonzero cosmological constant [20]. On the other hand,
allowing Q to vary does, unless PM(Q) is strongly peaked at small values of Q [21]. I
suspect that allowing ΩDM/Ωb or nγ/nb to vary along with Λ would have a similar effect.
3.6. So what should we do?
For those serious about making predictions in a multiverse, I would propose that
rather than working to generate additional incomplete anthropic arguments by taking
shortcuts, a much better job must be done in each of the individual ingredients. For
one example, our understanding of galaxy formation is sufficiently strong that the multi-
dimensional hospitality factor NO,M(αi) could probably be computed for αi within a few
orders of magnitude of the observed values, for O−objects of galaxies with properties
within some range. Second, despite some nice previous work, I think the problem of how
to compute PM in eternal inflation is a pretty open one. Finally, the string/M theory
landscape (which is generating a lot of interest in the present topic right now) cannot
hope to say much of anything about PM until its place in cosmology is understood
– in particular, we need both a better understanding of the statistical distribution of
field values that result from evolution in a given potential, and also an understanding
of how transitions between vacua with different flux values occur, and exactly what is
transitioning.
4. Cosmic coincidences and living dangerously: are there general
predictions of anthropic reasoning?
The preceding sections should have suggested to the reader that it will be a huge project
to compute a sound prediction of cosmological and physical parameters from a multiverse
theory in which they vary. It may be so hard that it will be a very long time before any
such calculation is at all believable. It is worth asking then: is there any way nature
might give us an indication as to whether the anthropic approach is a sensible one, i.e.
does the anthropic approach make any sort of general predictions even without the full
calculation of PO? Interestingly, I think the answer might be yes: I am aware of two
such general (though somewhat vague) predictions of the anthropic approach.
To understand the first, assume that only one parameter, α, varies, and consider
p(logα) = αPM(α), the probability distribution in logα, given by some theory T . For
logα near the observed value logαobs, p can basically only be doing one of three things:
it can rise with logα, fall with logα, or be approximately constant. In the first two
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cases, the theory T would predict that we should see a value of α that is, respectively,
higher or lower than we actually do if no anthropic conditionalization Nobs,M is applied.
Now suppose we somehow compute Nobs,M(α) and find that it falls off quickly for values
of α much smaller or larger than we observe, i.e. that only a range αmin∼<α∼<αmax
is “anthropically acceptable”. Then we have an anthropic argument explaining αobs,
because this falloff means that Pobs will only be significant near α
obs. But now note that
within the anthropically acceptable range, Pobs will be peaked near αmax if p is increasing
with α, or near αmin if p is decreasing with α. That is, we should expect α
obs at one edge
of the anthropically acceptable range. This idea has been called the “principle of living
dangerously” [26]. It asserts that for a parameter that is anthropically determined,
we should expect that a calculation of Nobs,M would reveal that observers would be
strongly suppressed either for α slightly larger or slightly smaller than αobs, depending
on whether p is rising or falling.
Now, this is not a very specific prediction: exactly where we would expect αobs to
lie depends both on how steep p(logα) is, and how sharp the cutoff in Nobs,M is for α
outside of the anthropically acceptable range. And it would not apply to anthropically-
determined parameters in all possible cases. (For example, if p were flat near αobs, but
also very high at α≫ αobs, anthropic effects would be required to explain why we do not
observe the very high value; but any region within the anthropically acceptable range
would be equally probable, so we would not expect to be, so to speak, living on the
edge.) Despite these caveats, this is a prediction of sorts, because the naive expectation
would probably be for our observation to place us somewhere in the interior of the region
of parameter space that is hospitable to life, rather than at the edge.
A second sort of general prediction of anthropic reasoning is connected to what
might be called “cosmic coincidences.” For example, many cosmologists have asked
themselves (and each other) why the current density in vacuum energy, dark matter,
baryons, and neutrinos are all within a couple of orders of magnitude of each other –
making the universe a much more complicated place than it might be. Conventionally,
it has been assumed that these coincidences are just that, and follow directly from
fundamental physics that we do not understand. But if the anthropic approach to
cosmology is really correct (that is, if it is the real answer to the question of why these
densities take the particular values they do), then the explanation is quite different:
the densities are bound together by the necessity of observers’ existence, because only
certain combinations will do.
More explicitly, suppose several cosmological parameters are governed by
completely unrelated physics, so that their individual prior probabilities PM simply
multiply to yield the multidimensional probability distribution. For example, we might
have PM(Λ,ΩDM/Ωb, Q) = PM(Λ)PM(ΩDM/Ωb)PM(Q). But even if P factors, the
hospitality factor Nobs,M will almost certainly not: if galaxies are O-objects, the number
of galaxies formed at a given Λ will depend on both other parameters, and only certain
combinations will give a significant number of observers. Thus PO = Nobs,MPM will
likewise have correlations between the different parameters that lead to only particular
Multiverse conundrums and coincidences 15
combinations (for example those with ΩDM/Ωb ∼ 1 − 10 for a given Q and Λ) having
high probabilities. The cosmic coincidences would be explained in this way.
This anthropic explanation of coincidences, however, should not only apply to
things that we have already observed. If it is correct, then it should apply also to
future observations; that is, we should expect to uncover yet more bizarre coincidences
between quantities that seem to follow from quite unrelated physics.
How might this actually happen? Consider dark matter. We know fairly precisely
how much dark matter there is in the universe, and what its basic properties are. But we
have no real idea what it actually is, and there are many, many possible candidates that
have been proposed in the literature. In fact, we have no observational reason to believe
that dark matter is one substance at all: in principle it could be equal parts axions,
supersymmetric particles, and primordial black holes. The reason most cosmologists do
not expect this is that it would be a strange coincidence if three substances involving
quite independent physics all wound up with essentially the same density in our universe.
But of course this would be just like the suprising-but-true coincidences that hold in
already-observed cosmology.
In the anthropic approach, these comparable densities could be quite natural [9].
To see why, imagine that there are two completely independent types of dark matter
permeating the ensemble: in each universe, they have some particular densities ρ1
and ρ2 out of a wide range of possibilities, so that the densities in a randomly chosen
universe (or around a randomly chosen baryon, etc.) will be given probabilistically by
PM(ρ1)PM(ρ2). Under these assumptions there is no reason to expect that we should
observe ρ1 ∼ ρ2 based just on these a priori probabilities. Now suppose, though, that
NO,M picks out a particular narrow range of total dark matter density as anthropically
acceptable. That is, NO,M(ρ1 + ρ2) is narrowly peaked about some ρanth. In this
case, the peak of the probability distribution PO(ρ1, ρ2), which indicates what values
a randomly chosen observer should see, will occur where PM(ρ1)PM(ρ2) is maximized
subject to the condition that ρ1 + ρ2 ≃ ρanth. For simplicity let both prior probabilities
be power laws: PM(ρ1) ∝ ρ
α
1 and PM(ρ2) ∝ ρ
β
2 . Now the coincidence: it is not hard
to show that if α ≥ 0 and β ≥ 0, then the maximum will occur when ρ1/ρ2 = α/β.
That is, the two components are likely to have similar densities unless the power law
indices of their probability distributions differ by orders of magnitude.∗ Of course, there
are many ways in which this coincidence could fail to occur (e.g. negative power-law
indices, or correlated probabilities), but the point is that there is a quite natural set
of circumstances in which the components are coincident, even though the fundamental
physics is completely unrelated.
∗ Extremely high power law indices are uncomfortable in the anthropic approach because they would
lead to PO being peaked where NO,M is declining, i.e. we should be living outside the anthropically
comfortable range, not just dangerously but downright recklessly.
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5. Conclusions
The preceding sections should have convinced the reader that there are good reasons
for scientists to be very worried if we live in a multiverse: in order to test a multiverse
theory in a sound manner, we must perform a fiendishly difficult calculation of PO(αi),
the probability that an O-object will reside in a universe characterized by parameters
αi. And because of the shortcomings of the shortcuts one may (and presently must)
take in doing this, almost any particular multiverse prediction is going to be easy to
criticize; only a quite good calculation is going to be at all convincing. Much worse, we
face an unavoidable and important choice in what O should be: a possible universe, or
an existing universe, or a universe matching current observations, or a bit of volume, or
a baryon, or a galaxy, or an “observer”, etc.
I find it disturbingly plausible that “observers” really are the correct
conditionalization object, that their use as such is the correct answer to the measure
problem, and that anthropic effects are the real explanation for the values of some
parameters (just as for the local density that we observe). Many cosmologiest appear
to believe that taking the necessity of observers into account is shoddy thinking, and is
employed only because it is the easy way out of solving problems the “right” way. But
the arguments of this paper suggest that the truth may well be exactly the opposite:
the anthropic approach may be the right thing to do in principle, but nearly impossible
in practice.
Nonetheless, we cannot do away with multiverses just by wishing them away: we
may in fact live in one, whatever the inconvenience to cosmologists. The productive
strategy then seems to be one of accepting multiverses as a possibility, and working
toward understanding how to calculate the various ingredients necessary to make
predictions in one. Whether really performing such a calculation will turn out to be
possible, but it is certainly impossible if not attempted.
Even if we cannot calculate PO in the foreseeable future, however, cosmology in a
multiverse may not be completely devoid of predictive power. For example, of anthropic
effects are at work, they should leave certain clues. First, if we could determine the
region of parameter space hospitable to observers, we should find that we are living in
the outskirts of the livable region, rather than somewere in its midst. Second, if the
anthropic effects are the explanation of the parameter values – and coincidences between
them – that we see, then it ought to predict that new coincidences will be observed in
future observations.
If in the next several decades dark matter is resolved into several equally important
components, dark energy is found to be three independent substances, and several other
“cosmic coincidences” are observed, even someone the most die-hard skeptics might
accede that the anthropic approach may have validity – why else would be universe be
so very baroque? On the other hand, if we are essentially finished in defining the basic
cosmological constituents, and the defining parameters are in the midst of a relatively
large region of parameter space that might arguably support observers, then I think the
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anthropic approach would lose almost all appeal it has; we would be forced to ask: why
isn’t the universe much wierder?
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